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Abstract—This paper extends the spare capacity allocation
(SCA) problem from single link failure [1] to dual link failures
on mesh-like IP or WDM networks. The SCA problem pre-plans
traffic flows with mutually disjoint one working and two backup
paths using the shared backup path protection (SBPP) scheme.
The aggregated spare provision matrix (SPM) is used to capture
the spare capacity sharing for dual link failures. Comparing to
a previous work by He and Somani [2], this method has better
scalability and flexibility. The SCA problem is formulated in
a non-linear integer programming model and partitioned into
two sequential linear sub-models: one finds all primary backup
paths first, and the other finds all secondary backup paths next.
The results on five networks show that the network redundancy
using dedicated 1+1+1 is in the range of 313-400%. It drops to
96-181% in 1:1:1 without loss of dual-link resiliency, but with
the trade-off of using the complicated share capacity sharing
among backup paths. The hybrid 1+1:1 provides intermediate
redundancy ratio at 187-310% with a moderate complexity. We
also compare the passive/active approaches which consider spare
capacity sharing after/during the backup path routing process.
The active sharing approaches always achieve lower redundancy
values than the passive ones. These reduction percentages are
about 12% for 1+1:1 and 25% for 1:1:1 respectively.
Index Terms—spare capacity allocation, shared backup path
protection, dual link failures, traffic engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
Survivability is a critical requirement for reliable services in
any network. A variety of survivability techniques (e.g., mul-
tiple homing, self-healing rings, pre-planned backup routes,
p-cycles, etc.) have been proposed for a range of network
technologies as surveyed in [3]. The vast majority of the
literature and implementations have focused on providing
survivability for single link/node/SRLG failures. However,
several recent studies have shown the need to address dual-
link failures in real networks, but this topic has received only
sporadic attention in the literature. This study is also initiated
from the real dual failure resiliency needs on several backbone
networks with high risk of component failures. The approach
in this paper is to minimize the pre-planned spare resource
while guaranteeing 100% service recovery upon any dual-
link failure in mesh-like IP/MPLS or WDM networks. We
adopt the shared backup path protection (SBPP) scheme to
provide network survivability. The SBPP scheme is an end-
to-end protection scheme. Each traffic flow will maintain a
working path, and in the dual-link failure case two pre-planned
backup paths are needed. These three paths must be mutually
link disjoint in order to provide dual-link failure survivability.
i.e., the traffic can always be restored on all dual link failures,
no matter these links fail at the same time or sequentially. If
a dual link failure happens and disconnects both the working
path and the primary backup path, the secondary backup path
can still recover traffic and maintain service continuity. Note
that, the spare capacity on links can be shared among backup
paths from flows whose working paths are disjoint. This paper
will answer two important questions: how to compute this
shared spare capacity for dual link failures; and how this could
reduce redundancy in the path protection schemes.
The remainder of this section will be a literature review
and a quick introduction on the SCA model using SBPP for
single failure resiliency. A new integer programming model of
the SCA problem for dual-link failures is given in Section II.
Based on this model, several backup path protection schemes
are described to provide 100% dual failure resiliency in
Section III. Section IV provides the comparative studies and
analysis. Lastly, Section V concludes the paper.
A. Related works
The SBPP scheme has been successfully used to provide
end to end path protection for any single link failure. It is one
of the basic survivability methods and has received intensive
research focus [4], [5], [6]. In particular, we studied the spare
capacity allocation problem using the SBPP scheme for any
single link/node/SRLG failure in [1]. Here, we extend our
previous work to protect against dual-link failures.
In recent years, the dual failure problem has been studied
in various directions [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14],
[15], [16], [17], [2]. Clouqueur and Grover, in [7] studies
the performance of a network planned to protect single span
failures when dual failures occur. The numerical results show
that the majority of the traffic flows will not be impacted
by the second failure even though the network is planned
for single failure resiliency. Three approaches are further
discussed in [8] to study span-restorable design problems for
dual failure: minimize cost, maximize restorability, or min-
imize capacity under a combination of demand restorability
requirements. Doucette, et. al, in [9] studies the dual-failure
restorability of the SBPP network that is designed to survive
all single failures. Doucette and colleagues formulated and
studied p-cycle network design problems considering dual-
failure restorability in [10] and [11]. Choi in [12] proposes
a novel method to use a single backup path for each link to
protect dual failures. It plans the single backup route for each
link and any link on this backup route will have a backup route
not reusing the originally link. The local protection method
by Srini in [13] also uses a single backup path for each
link to protect dual-link failure. Backup link mutual exclusion
constraints are provided in an ILP model and a heuristic
algorithm with polynomial solution time is developed. Zhang
in [14] takes a reactive approach to reduce traffic disruption
after multiple concurrent failures. A backup reprovisioning
is triggered after each failure to protect against the next set
of possible failures. A hybrid approach is studied for two-
link failure by Ruan in [15]. It pre-plans backup resource to
protect the first link failure while using a restoration method
for the second. The numerical results indicate a very high
restoration ratio for the second failure. This is quite similar to
the high redundancy value of the dual-failure restorability on
span restorable and SBPP networks in [7] and [9]. For IP over
optical networks, various dual failure protection schemes are
discussed in [16]. Since both layers have separate protection
schemes, it is quite important for backbone network service
providers to combine these resource and mechanisms for dual
failure resiliency. A recent vendor implementation is Huawei’s
synergetic protection [17] where the protection schemes on
both IP and optical layers are coordinated to achieve the dual
failure resiliency with minimum capital expenditure.
In the work closest to ours, He and Somani [2] addresses
the joint working and spare capacity allocation problem with
an ILP model. In their model, every traffic flow has a set
of pre-computed and mutually disjoint candidate paths. These
paths will be selected as one working and two backup paths
to protect any double link failures. Between any two traffic
flows, a set of conditions are listed to indicate when the
capacity of two backup paths cannot share on their overlapped
links. This is called backup multiplexing. Their ILP model
captures all these non-sharing conditions between any two
flows so that the roles of candidate backup paths can be
chosen to minimize the total capacity. This work contributes
to the understanding of spare capacity sharing (or backup
multiplexing) for dual link failures. However, there are some
limitations in this model. First, it is difficult to scale for large
network. The spare capacity sharing (backup multiplexing)
constraints in this model depend on complete path information
of pair-wise flows. For a large number of flows, the number
of the constraints will increase quadratically. Secondly, the
pre-computed path set over which the working and backup
paths are determined is limited to three disjoint paths in order
to reduce the search space of the optimization model. These
limitations are part of the reasons to revisit this problem here.
We uses an aggregated per-flow information to compute spare
capacity sharing for dual failure protection. The same concept
has been successfully used for single failure protection in [18],
[19], [20]. A detailed literature review on this topic is in [1].
B. SCA Model for Single Failures
This section briefly reviews the SCA model to protect
against single failures on a single layer network. [1], [21]
The network under study uses the Shared Backup Path
Protection(SBPP) scheme for any single failures. SBPP allows
each flow to use a disjoint backup path to protect its working
path upon any single failure. Assume all traffic flows require
100% restoration for any single failure. Provisioning enough
spare capacity becomes critical to such restoration require-
ment. The notation used in the paper is summarized in Table I.
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TABLE I
NOTATION
N,L,R,K Numbers of nodes, links, flows and failures
n, l, r, k Indices of nodes, links, flows and failures
P = {pr} = {prl} Working path link incidence matrix
Q = {qr} = {qrl} Backup path link incidence matrix
M = Diag({mr}) Diagonal matrix of bandwidth mr of flow r
G = {glk}L×K Spare provision matrix, glk is spare capacity
on link l for failure k
Gr = {gr
lk
}L×K Contribution of flow r to G
s = {sl}L×1 Spare capacity vector
φ = {φl}L×1 Spare capacity cost function
W,S Total working, spare capacity
η = S/W Network redundancy
o(r), d(r) Origin/destination nodes of flow r
B = {bnl}N×L Node link incidence matrix
D = {drn}R×N Flow node incidence matrix
F = {fkl}K×L Failure link incidence matrix, fkl = 1 iff
link l fails in failure scenario k
U = {urk}R×K Flow failure incidence matrix, urk = 1
iff failure scenario k will affect flow r’s
working path
T = {trl}R×L Flow tabu-link matrix, trl = 1 iff link l
should not be used on flow r’s backup path
We model an un-capacitated network by a directed graph
of N nodes, L links, and R flows. Flow r, 1 ≤ r ≤ R has
its origin/destination node pair (o(r), d(r)) and traffic demand
mr. Working and backup paths of flow r are represented by
two 1× L binary row vectors pr = {prl} and qr = {qrl} re-
spectively. The l-th element in one of the vectors equals to one
if and only if (iff) the corresponding path uses link l. The path
link incidence matrices for working and backup paths are the
collections of these vectors, forming two R×L matrices P =
{prl} and Q = {qrl} respectively. Let M = Diag({mr}R×1)
denote the diagonal matrix representing demand bandwidth.
The topology is represented by the node-link incidence matrix
B = (bnl)N×L where bnl = 1 or −1 iff node n is the origin
or the destination node of link l. D = (drn)R×N is the flow
node incidence matrix where drn = 1 or −1 iff o(r) = n
or d(r) = n. We characterize K failure scenarios in a binary
matrix F = {fk}K×1 = {fkl}K×L. The row vector fk in
F is for failure scenario k and its element fkl equals one
iff link l fails in scenario k. In this way, each failure scenario
includes a set of one or more links that will fail simultaneously
in the scenario. For a failed node, all its adjacent links are
marked as failed. We also denote a flow failure incidence
matrix U = {ur}R×1 = {urk}R×K , where urk = 1 iff
flow r will be affected by failure k, and urk = 0 otherwise.
The flow tabu-link matrix T = {tr}R×1 = {trl}R×L has
trl = 1 iff the backup path of flow r should not use link l,
and trl = 0 otherwise. We can find U and T given P and
F as shown in equations (7) and (8) respectively. A binary
matrix multiplication operation “⊙” is used in equations (7)
and (8). It is a matrix multiply operator that is identical to
normal matrix multiplication except that the general numerical
addition 1 + 1 = 2 will be replaced by the boolean addition
1 + 1 = 1. Using this binary operator, the logical relations
among links, paths and failure scenarios are simplified into
two matrix operations.
Let G = {glk}L×K denote the spare provision matrix
(SPM) whose elements glk are the minimum spare capacity
required on link l when failure k occurs. Note that K = L
when the SCA protects all single link failures. Given the
backup paths Q, the demand bandwidth matrix M , the work-
ing path P , and the failure matrix F , G can be determined
by equation (3) with the help of (7). The minimum spare
capacity required on each link is denoted by the column
vector s = {sl}L×1, which is found in equation (2). The
function max in (2) asserts that an element in s is equal to
the maximum element in the corresponding row of G. It is
equivalent to s ≥ G in this optimization model. Let φl denote
the cost function of spare capacity on link l. φ = {φl}L×1
is a column vector of these cost functions and φ(s) gives the
cost vector of the spare capacities on all links. The total cost
of spare capacity in the network is eTφ(s), where e is unit
column vector of size L. Here for simplicity, we assume all
cost functions φ(s) are identity functions, i.e., φ(s) = s.
Given the notation and definitions above the spare capacity
allocation (SCA) problem can be formulated as follows.
min
Q,s
S = eT s (1)
s.t. s = maxG (2)
G = QTMU (3)
T +Q ≤ 1 (4)
QBT = D (5)
Q : binary (6)
U = P ⊙ F T (7)
T = U ⊙ F (8)
This SCA problem has the objective to minimize the total
spare capacity in (1) with the constraints (2)–(8). The decision
variables are the backup path matrix Q and the spare capacity
vector s. Constraints (2) and (3) associates these variables,
i.e., the spare capacity allocation s is derived from the backup
paths in Q. Constraint (4) guarantees that every backup path
will not use any link which might fail simultaneously with
any link on its working path. Flow conservation constraint (5)
guarantees that backup paths given in Q are feasible paths
of flows in a directed network. Note, the incidence matrices
U and T are pre-computed. The matrix U indicates the
failure cases that will influence the working paths. The matrix
T indicates the links that should be avoided in the backup
paths. In this paper, the link load, the traffic flows and their
routes are assumed symmetric. In a directed network, each link
might have two directions with asymmetric load. In this case,
the dimensions of these matrices should be doubled, i.e. 2L,
instead of L. A more detailed explanation of the SCA model
above is in [1, eq.(7)-(14)].
The spare provision matrix G can be obtained, in a second
approach, by aggregation of per-flow based information. This
also contributes significantly on scalability for its dual failure
extensions.
First, each flow r has a contribution to G as Gr =
{grlk}L×K in (9), where ur and qr are the r-th row vectors in
U and Q. The spare provision matrix G, thus, is calculated
in (10). It is also shown in the stack of Gr in Fig. 1.
Gr = mr(q
T
r ur), ∀r, 1 ≤ r ≤ R (9)
G =
R∑
r=1
Gr (10)
GR
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Fig. 1. SCA structure for protecting arbitrary failures
Using above matrices, per-flow based information in P , Q
is replaced by G as the stored network state information for
spare capacity sharing. The space complexity is reduced from
O(RL) to O(LK) and it is independent of the number of
flows, R. This improves the scalability of the spare capacity
sharing information and makes it possible for distributed
implementation. Moreover, in this paper we will utilize this
feature to capture the spare capacity sharing for dual-link
failures.
II. SCA MODEL FOR DUAL LINK FAILURES
This section introduces the spare capacity allocation (SCA)
model to protect against dual-link failures. The SBPP scheme
is used here. Each flow has one working path and two backup
paths. All of which are mutually disjoint so a single dual-
link failure will only disconnect two paths at the same time.
This requires the network to be at least three-connected as
is typically assumed in the literature. A recent work by Tsin
has provided an easy and fast linear algorithm to verify tri-
connectivity [22]. In a network with three or more connectiv-
ity, at least three disjoint paths can be found using a maximum
flow algorithm on a network with every link capacity at one
unit and three units of demand from source to destination [23].
It is similar to the algorithm that finds two disjoint paths in [6].
For a network that is not tri-connected, but bi-connected,
a set of cut-pairs can be identified to indicate all link pairs
whose absence could partition the network. The dual failure
cases of these cut-pairs will never be protected. To remedy the
requirement of 100% dual failure resiliency, a work-around
resiliency criteria in this situation is a partial dual failure
protection method. This is addressed separately in [24].
A. Spare Capacity Sharing among Primary Backup Paths
Before diving into the optimization problem formulation, we
show that there is a smaller chance of spare capacity sharing
among primary backup paths, comparing to single failures.
This comes from Theorem 1 first.
Theorem 1: To protect dual link failures, primary backup
paths of any two flows will not be able to share their spare
capacity on their overlapped links directly.
Proof: For any two flows, if their primary backup paths
overlap on a link, the spare capacity on this link has to be
equal to the sum of their bandwidth demand. Because there are
dual link failure cases that contain one link in each of the two
working paths of these flows, resulting in both primary backup
paths being used at the same time. Hence their overlapped link
cannot share spare capacity.
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Fig. 2. Two unit spare capacity are shared by three primary backup paths
on link 7–8
In addition, multiple (more than two) primary backup paths
might still be able to share their spare capacity. An example is
shown in Figure 2. There are three mutually disjoint working
paths 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6 in wavy lines, requiring one unit
capacity each. Their primary backup paths overlap on link 7-
8. The spare capacity on this link should be two. This value
cannot be one: when a dual failure disconnects two out of
three working paths, their primary backup paths will need
one unit each on link 7–8. This leads to a minimum capacity
of two on link 7-8. Moreover, any dual link failure will not
break these three flows at the same time. Their primary backup
paths will never fail at the same time. So the spare capacity
on link 7–8 does not need to be three, which equals to the
spare capacity required for dedicated protection. This example
indicates that the spare capacity sharing for the primary
backup paths happens only among three or more flows. This
makes it difficult to enumerate all these situations for multiple
flows. A scalable method of spare capacity sharing should
come from every single flow.
B. Collect Information for Each Flow
As mentioned earlier, the ILP model proposed in [2] focuses
on every pair of flows. This limits its scalability. In this paper,
a single flow r is put under the spotlight. Its contribution to
the spare provision matrix Gr is used as the building block
for spare capacity sharing. Element grlk indicates the spare
capacity required for flow r on link l when dual-link failure
case k happens. The total number of dual link failures is K =(
L
2
)
. Each failure k ∈ 1..K stands for a pair of failed links i, j
and the index k is determined as k = (i−1)×L+(j−i) where
1 ≤ i < j ≤ L. Assume the failures of two links happen at
the same time or shortly close to each other so that the traffic
rerouting happens only once. In dual-link failure scenario k,
the working and backup paths of flow r may be impacted and
the spare capacity on their backup paths will need bandwidth
reservation as discussed in the following cases:
1) When a dual link failure k breaks the working path, but
not the primary backup path, traffic will be protected
by the primary backup path. The links on the primary
backup path requires a bandwidth demand mr.
In the formulation, pri = 1 iff link i is on the working
path pr and qrj = 1 iff a link j is on the primary backup
path qr. Then pri(1− qrj) = 1 indicates link i is on the
working path while link j is not on the primary backup
path. Let urk = pri(1− qrj)⊕ (1− qri)prj , where ⊕ is
the binary plus which gives 1 ⊕ 1 = 1. Then urk = 1
indicates failure k contains one link on the working path
pr but does not contain any link on the primary backup
path qr. For this failure case k, the spare capacity on
another link l on the primary backup path should reserve
bandwidth mr. This is formulated in gr[1]lk = mrqrlurk.
These equations can also be rewritten in a vector or
matrix format in (11) and (12).
Gr[1] = {g
r[1]
lk } = mrq
T
r u
1
r (11)
u1r = vec(p
T
r q¯r ⊕ q¯
T
r pr) (12)
In the above equations, vec(·) converts a matrix with
index (i, j) into a row vector with index k and q¯r =
e− qr where e is a unit row vector with size L.
Notice that the length of the row vector u1r is L2
instead of number of failures
(
L
2
)
. This helps to maintain
easier matrix formulation and conversion between k and
i, j. The actual failure size can be easily controlled by
removing duplicated cases during the implementation.
For this reason, we use k = (i − 1)L + j and K = L2
in the rest of the paper.
2) When the failure case k contains one link on the working
path pr and another link on the primary backup path
qr, traffic is rerouted to the secondary backup path zr.
Thus, the links on the secondary backup path need spare
capacity to meet bandwidth demand mr for failure case
k. In this case, urk = priqrj ⊕ qriprj . Then urk = 1
indicates failure case k breaks the working path pr and
the primary backup path qr at the same time. Hence, the
spare capacity on link l on the secondary backup path is
mr. This gives gr[2]lk = mrzrlurk. These equations can
be rewritten in matrix format in (13) and (14).
Gr[2] = {g
r[2]
lk } = mrz
T
r u
2
r (13)
u2r = vec(p
T
r qr ⊕ q
T
r pr) (14)
With two cases above, the final per-flow based spare provi-
sion matrix is given in (15).
Gr = Gr[1] +Gr[2]. (15)
The failure matrices F and T in (7) and (8) in the single
failure SCA model will not be used in the SCA model for the
dual link failures. F becomes the identical matrix for the link
failure, and T is simplified to P .
C. SCA Model for Dual Link Failures
Using the aggregation of the per-flow based spare provision
matrix above, and the additional notation in Table II, the SCA
model for dual link failures is formulated in (16)–(22).
TABLE II
ADDITIONAL NOTATION FOR DUAL LINK FAILURES
i, j Indices of links in a dual failure k
Q = {qr} = {qrl} Primary backup path link incidence matrix
Z = {zr} = {zrl} Secondary backup path link incidence matrix
Gr[y] = {g
r[y]
lk
}L×K Contribution of flow r’s y-th backup path to
G, y = 1 or 2 for primary or secondary
Uy = {uy
rk
}R×K The incidence matrix for flow’s y-th backup
path and failures, uy
rk
= 1 iff failure sce-
nario k will cause flow r’s traffic to use its
y-th backup path, y = 1 or 2
S1, S2 Total spare capacity reserved for the primary
or secondary backup paths
η1, η2 Redundancy value for the primary or sec-
ondary backup paths, ηy = Sy/W
δs, γs Value and percentage of redundancy reduc-
tion from the Passive to the Active approach
in scheme s, s is 1+1:1 or 1:1:1
min
Q,Z,s
S = eT s (16)
s.t. s = maxG (17)
G = QTMU1 +ZTMU2 (18)
P +Q+Z ≤ 1 (19)
QBT = D (20)
ZBT = D (21)
Q,Z : binary (22)
The objective function (16) is very similar to (1), to min-
imize the total spare capacity. Its decision variables include
not only the spare capacity s and the primary backup path
matrix Q, but also the secondary backup path matrix Z. In
constraint (17), the spare capacity column vector s is derived
from the maximum values of elements in rows, across all
failures, in the spare provision matrix G. It indicates that
the required spare capacity on a link is equivalent to the
highest “watermark” from all possible dual link failures. In
constraint (18), the spare provision matrix is derived from
backup paths. It is a matrix format, equivalent to the aggre-
gation of per-flow based information from (10), (15), (11),
and (13). Constraint (19) requires the working and backup
paths to be mutually disjoint, i.e., these paths will use the
same link at most once. Constraints (20) and (21) are the flow
balance requirements, to guarantee these paths in Q and Z
to be valid routes between the source and destination nodes.
Constraint (22) requires backup path decision variables to
be binary ensuring each backup path is not bifurcated. Row
vectors uy in Uy, y ∈ 1, 2 are derived in (12) and (14) to
indicate which failure case k could cause traffic detour to its
primary or secondary backup path.
D. Solution Approach
The SCA model above is a non-linear integer program-
ming problem. Both terms in the right side of (18) involve
two design variables to multiply together. In the first term
QTMU1, the design variable Q times another variable U1
which is further computed from qr in (12). Similarly, the
second term ZTMU2 is also based on the multiplication of
decision variables Z and Q via u2 in (14). To remove the
non-linearity in the first term, we replace (12) with a slightly
different equation (23), where the original q¯r is replaced by e.
u1r = vec(p
T
r e⊕ e
Tpr) (23)
This change increases the SPM value on the links along
the primary backup path, under the failure cases that also
disconnect this primary backup path. These values are zero
in the previous equation (12). Consequently, these values in
the spare provision matrix might slightly decrease the spare
capacity sharing chances with other flows.
To cope with the non-linearity in the second term, we
partition the original SCA model into two models: one is to
find the primary backup paths first, and the other is to find the
secondary backup paths afterward. It simplifies the solution
approach but might increase the required spare capacity. It is
possible to replace the non-linear constraint by adding extra
variables and constraints using integer programming modeling
techniques. It might achieve better optimality. However, this
paper takes the partitioning way for better computation speed.
1) Find Primary Backup Paths First: In order to find the
primary backup paths, the ILP model is given in (24)–(29) to
find total spare capacity for primary backup paths S1.
min
Q,s1
S1 = e
Ts1 (24)
s.t. s1 = maxG[1] (25)
G[1] = QTMU1 (26)
P +Q ≤ 1 (27)
QBT = D (28)
Q : binary (29)
Most of these equations are similar to the previous model
except the incidence matrix U1 is found using (23).
2) Find Secondary Backup Paths with Fixed Primary
Backup Paths: After the primary backup paths are determined,
the secondary backup paths can be determined with the
objective function to minimize the total spare capacity in (16)
with the design variables Z and s. The constraints are (17)–
(22), (12), and (14). However, the difference here is that the
primary backup paths Q and its derived matrix U [1] have been
fixed. The formulation becomes an ILP model.
Both of these ILP models are NP-complete. We will solve
them on smaller networks using commercial software AMPL
with ILP solvers, such as CPLEX or Gurobi, that normally use
the branch and cut algorithm. To solve for larger networks,
a previous heuristic algorithm, called successive survivable
routing (SSR), can be extended to find near optimal solutions
quickly. This is left for future work.
III. BACKUP PATH PROTECTION SCHEMES
The backup path protection schemes can be coded on how
the backup paths reserve spare capacity: “+1” for dedicated
spare capacity and “:1” for shared spare capacity. 1
1+1+1 stands for the dedicated path protection with no
capacity sharing among backups.
1+1:1 is the hybrid backup path protection with the ded-
icated spare capacity for primary backup paths and
shared bandwidth for secondary backup paths.
1:1:1 is the SBPP scheme that allows spare capacity shar-
ing among all backup paths.
We further study the relationship between the spare capacity
sharing and the backup path routing for 1+1:1 and 1:1:1
schemes using two methods: active and passive. Active method
combines the spare capacity sharing during the backup path
routing. Passive method will find the backup paths first,
then determines the shared spare capacity. Based on these
definitions, five schemes for dual link failure protection are
compared in terms of the total spare capacity for primary
backup paths S1, and for secondary backup paths S2, where
S1, S are found in (24),(16) and S2 = S − S1. We also listed
three schemes for single link failures [1].
1) Dedicated 1+1+1 is the dedicated path protection
scheme. It uses the shortest path algorithm to find
mutually disjoint primary and secondary backup paths.
The spare capacity on these backup paths are reserved
separately. There is no spare capacity sharing. This
scheme should use the largest total spare capacity.
2) Passive 1+1:1 also uses the shortest path algorithm to
find mutually disjoint primary and secondary backup
paths. Only after all backup paths are found, the spare
capacity among secondary backup paths will then be
shared based on the spare provision matrix method
in (30) and (31).
s2 = maxG
[2] (30)
G[2] = ZTMU2 (31)
3) Active 1+1:1 scheme uses the shortest path algorithm to
find mutually disjoint primary backup paths. After that,
the ILP model in §II-D2 is used to find the secondary
backup paths.
4) Passive 1:1:1 scheme uses the shortest path algorithm
to find mutually disjoint primary and secondary backup
paths. After these paths are found, their spare capacity
for all backup paths will then be shared using the spare
provision matrix method in (17) and (18).
5) Active 1:1:1 scheme considers spare capacity sharing
during the process of finding both backup paths. We use
the ILP models sequentially in §II-D1 and §II-D2 to find
these backup paths which also produce the minimum
total spare capacity in these ILP sub-models. For large
networks, finding approximation solutions is currently
under development.
6) Dedicated 1+1 is the dedicated path protection scheme
for single link failure. It uses the shortest path algorithm
to find mutually disjoint backup paths and the spare
1This could be defined as “1+” or “1:” for dedicated/shared spare capacity.
It will be compatible with the “M:N” protection where M backup links protect
N working links. For this reason, we do not use aggregated form such as “1:2”
or “2:1” to avoid confusion.
capacity on these backup paths are reserved dedicated
to this flow. There is no sharing.
7) Passive 1:1 scheme uses the shortest path algorithm to
find a backup path disjoint from its working path. The
spare capacity for all backup paths will then be shared
using the spare provision matrix method in (2) and (3).
8) Active 1:1 scheme considers spare capacity sharing
during the process of finding both backup paths. The ILP
model in §I-B or [1] is used to find these backup paths
which also produce the minimum total spare capacity.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDY
Numerical experiments were performed on the five network
topologies shown in Figure 3. The results are given in Ta-
ble III. The network node count ranges from 5 to 50 with an
average node degree from 3.4 to 4.4, as shown in the first
five rows. Each network has a full-meshed flows with one
unit bandwidth demand. The working paths are pre-determined
using the shortest path algorithm. The total working capacity
W is listed in the sixth row.
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Net5: (N,L,R) = (50, 86, 2450)
Fig. 3. Networks used for numerical study
The following rows list the numerical results for the dif-
ferent path protection schemes. We focus on the total spare
capacity for primary, secondary, and both backup paths, i.e.,
TABLE III
RESULTS ON FIVE NETWORKS
Network 1 2 3 4 5
Num. of nodes N 5 10 11 17 50
Num. of links L 10 22 22 33 86
Avg. node deg. d 4 4.4 4 3.9 3.44
Num. of flows R 20 90 110 272 2450
Total working cap. W 20 142 190 626 10888
S1 40 198 282 846 15136
S2 40 246 376 1216 22208
Dedicated S 80 444 658 2062 37344
1+1+1 η1 200% 139% 148% 135% 139%
η2 200% 173% 198% 194% 204%
η 400% 313% 346% 329% 343%
S1 40 198 282 846 15136
S2 22 110 192 494 8938
Passive S 62 308 474 1340 24074
1+1:1 η1 200% 139% 148% 135% 139%
η2 110% 77% 101% 79% 82%
η 310% 217% 249% 214% 221%
S1 40 198 282 846 15136
S2 14 74 142 322 -
Active S 54 272 424 1168 - ‡
1+1:1 η1 200% 139% 148% 135% 139%
η2 70% 52% 75% 51% -
η 270% 192% 223% 187% -
δ1+1:1 40% 25% 26% 27% -
γ1+1:1 13% 12% 11% 13% -
S1 24 152 216 588 10450
S2 12 44 128 220 6494
Passive S 36 196 344 808 16944
1:1:1 η1 120% 107% 114% 94% 96%
η2 60% 31% 67% 35% 60%
η 180% 138% 181% 129% 156%
S1 20 92 168 390 † -‡
Time(s) 6.2 598 19 20hr† -
S2 16 56 96 214 -
S 36 148 264 604 -
Active Time(s) 0.27 1.2 0.42 3.0 -
1:1:1 η1 100% 65% 88% 62% -
η2 80% 39% 51% 34% -
η 180% 104% 139% 96% -
δ1:1:1 0% 34% 43% 32% -
γ1:1:1 0% 24% 24% 25% -
Passive S1 14 94 142 380 6738
1:1 η1 70% 66% 75% 61% 62%
S1 10 50 94 208 4544
Active Time(s) 2 11 11 713 16.6hr
1:1 η1 50% 35% 49% 33% 42%
δ1:1 20% 31% 25% 27% 20%
γ1:1 40% 88% 51% 83% 48%
†: This is a near optimal solution with an absolute MIP gap of 4
using Gurobi after 20 hours. Other ILP results are optimal using
CPLEX. Time is in second on an Intel Core i5 2.4GHz CPU.
‡: No solution found due to memory limitation in AMPL.
S1, S2, S respectively. Their redundancy value η1, η2, η are
also listed, where η = S
W
. For the “Active 1:1:1”, the time
(in second) to compute S1 and S using AMPL with CPLEX
or Gurobi solvers are also provided. For the rest of the results,
the computation time is less than seconds hence ignored.
In the bottom of Table III, the results from the 1:1 schemes
are listed to compare the required redundancy for single versus
dual link failures.
These redundancy values η1 and η2 in the results table are
also drawn as a bar chart in Figure 4. For each scheme, we
stack these values together so the total redundancy η can be
seen by the top of the bar. From the numerical results several
interesting observations are noted as follows:
The redundancy can be reduced by increasing the complex-
ity. The 1+1+1 dedicated protection scheme has the highest
redundancy range of 313−400%. It reduces down to 96−181%
in 1:1:1 SBPP scheme without loss of dual-link resiliency. This
trade-off between redundancy and complexity is very impor-
tant to evaluate various protection schemes. The hybrid 1+1:1
scheme provides intermediate redundancy ratio at 187−310%,
while its complexity is also moderate between the other two
schemes.
The active approach always has lower redundancy than the
passive approach. The results show that active scheme always
has lower redundancy compared to corresponding passive
scheme in both 1+1:1 and 1:1:1 schemes. Furthermore, we
denote the reduction value δs and ratio γs for the network
redundancy from the Passive to Active approach in the same
schemes s, and compute them in (32).
δs = η
Passive
s − η
Active
s ,
γs = δs/η
Passive
s , s ∈ {1+1:1, 1:1:1, 1:1} (32)
from the numerical results in Table III, we notice that γ1+1:1
is about 12% across four networks, while γ1:1:1 is about 25%
for the three non-trivial networks 2–4. This is a very interesting
findings and needs further analysis.
The secondary backup paths use less spare capacity than
the primary backup paths in SBPP. In both 1+1:1 and 1:1:1
schemes, the secondary backup paths uses less spare capacity
than that of the primary backup paths need. The ratio of S2
S1
varies from 0.8 in the result of active 1:1:1 on network 1
down to 0.29 in the result of passive 1:1:1 on network 2. On
the contrary in the dedicated 1+1+1 scheme, the secondary
backup paths use same or more spare capacity than the primary
backup paths with the same ratio varies from 1 to 1.47.
It requires much more redundancy to protect 100% dual
link failures than single link failures. When we compare the
network redundancy on the first four networks, the Active
1:1:1 has about 1.8–2.6 times of redundancy value comparing
to that of the Active 1:1 scheme. This large increase on the
redundancy is critical for the network service providers to
make decision between these protection mechanisms and their
extra resource requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper answers two important questions for dual link
failure protection: how to compute the spare capacity sharing
in SBPP; and how it helps reducing network redundancy in the
backup path protection schemes. Numerical study shows that
the five backup path protection schemes cover a spectrum of
network redundancy in a decreasing order, while their sharing
complexity increases.
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